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TOBACCO WARS AND THE NEW MINORITY
DONALD W. GARNER*
The rise and fall of Congressional efforts to forge a comprehen-
sive settlement of the tobacco wars provoked a host of interesting
questions that were vigorously debated over the last year. Would dra-
matic increases in taxes dramatically decrease juvenile use?1 Would
these new taxes bankrnpt the weaker cigarette makers and lead to
smuggling?2 How would decreased tobacco use affect the bucolic lives
of tobacco farmers?' Would restraints on advertising lessen tobacco's
appeal to youth, and would these restraints pass constitutional exami-
nation?4 These questions are important and deserve answers but
there is one question of fundamental importance that was never seri-
ously entertained. Is it fair to impose a half trillion dollars in new
taxes on America's poorest and least educated adults as they strive to
satisfy their addiction to nicotine?
Posing, if not answering this question, is the subject of this article.
In so doing, this article seeks to advance two common sense and inex-
tricably connected ideas. The first is one of policy: it is wrong to pun-
ish the poor for the benefit of others. The second is one of politics: it
is stupid to turn a public health initiative into a tax and spend issue
and expect it to pass.
This article will proceed by first setting out a quick history of
Washington's efforts to pass tobacco legislation, including an analysis
of the bill sponsored by Senator McCain.5 Part II will describe the
unique economic and social status of smokers and consider whether
the McCain Bill was justified in its treatment of adult smokers. Part III
will step away from the debris left by the collapse of the Congress'
* D & L Straus Distinguished Visiting Professor, Pepperdine University School of
Law. The author wishes to express his thanks and appreciation for the editorial and re-
search assistance provided by Kevin Angel and David Greer.
1. See, e.g., Tobacco Issues: Hearings on S. 1415 Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 105th
Cong. (1998) (statement of Martin Feldman, Equity Analyst for Salomon Smith Barney);
Big Price Boost Would Deter Youths'Smoking, SAN ANTONIO EXPREsS-NEWS, Dec. 10, 1997, at 6B.
Children's smoking habits are, in fact, the most price-sensitive of any other smoking group.
See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 106 (1992).
2. See Bruce Bartlett, Hiking Cigarette Taxes is Good for (Illegal) Business, WALL ST. J., May
12, 1998, at A22.
3. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
4. See Donald Garner, Fighting the Tobacco Wars on First Amendment Grounds, 27
Sw.U.L.J. 379 passim (1998).
5. S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
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attempts at tobacco legislation and will suggest a much narrower legis-
lative approach that would not abuse smokers, and yet would vigor-
ously serve the legitimate interests of public health.
I. TOBACCO LEGISLATION
A. Quick History
On June 20, 1997, the tobacco industry, various Attorneys Gen-
eral, and public health representatives made a startling announce-
ment: they settled their differences through a "comprehensive
settlement."6 Big Tobacco was to receive significant civil relief from
punitive damages and class action suits in addition to an annual cap
on the amount of damages that the industry would have to pay from
the suits that were not eliminated.7 The price of these immunities was
not cheap. The states and various plaintiffs got over $368 billion to
settle their Medicaid suits and class actions.' The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) got limited authority to regulate tobacco.9 Other
strong public health initiatives were planned and funded along with
significant curbs on tobacco advertising and marketing.1l
Then the trouble started. Various public health organizations
thought the settlement was too soft on the industry." Demands for
much higher taxes and more regulations were coupled with demands
for the elimination of all civil immunities agreed to in the June 20,
1997 settlement.1 2 Congress and the President jumped into the fray
and what began as an extraordinary public health measure to prevent
teenage smoking became a wide-open pork barrel for more Washing-
ton spending."3 President Clinton proposed to use smokers' money
to pay for more federal child care, 100,000 new teachers, NASA space-
ships, school computers, and climate studies.14 Congress wanted to
6. See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://www.tobacco
resolution.com>; Samuel Goldreich, Deal Struck to Curb Tobacco Industy $360 Billion Pact
Includes Regulations, Liability Limits, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al.
7. See The Tobacco Resolution, supra note 6.
8. See Goldreich, supra note 6, at Al.
9. See id.
10. See Garner, supra note 4.
11. See Kessler and Koop Spot the Potholes in the Settlement, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 14, 1997,
at B6.
12. Id.
13. See Sean Holton, Tobacco Cash May Not Be Ours, President Clinton's Budget Could Gobble
Up Some of Florida's Money for Areas Unrelated to Smoking, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1998, at
Al.
14. See id. See also Bob Hohler, Budget Plans Totter with Tobacco Deal - Some of Clinton's
Favorite Initiatives Depend on a Windfall from the Faltering Accord, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
April 11, 1998, at A2 (discussing President Clinton's plans to use any tobacco settlement
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fund Social Security, Medicare, drug abuse programs, pothole
patches, and marriage tax equalization.' 5 State politicians also began
plotting the use of tobacco funds that would come to them from the
Federal tax.16
These strong lobbying pressures produced a number of bills, 7
with Senator McCain's bill being the only one to be voted out of Com-
mittee and sent to the Senate. i" All bills shared several things in com-
mon: massive increases in cigarette taxation, meager industry relief
from lawsuits, and lots of new spending.19
B. The McCain Bill
The McCain Bill would have funded dozens of federal programs
new and old, including the State Litigation Settlement Account,20 the
Public Health Allocation Account,21 the Health and Health-related
money to fund research for NASA, NIH, the Internet, high-speed computers, climate
change, energy and agriculture, FDA tobacco regulation enforcement, smoking uptake
prevention programs, cutting edge cancer therapies, state block grants, child care for poor
families, more teachers, children's health care, and tobacco farmer assistance programs);
'Save Medicare First, Sen. Domenici Says; Chairman of Budget Panel Differs With Clinton on Spend-
ing Priorities, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1998, at A24 (discussing Senator Pete Domenici's argu-
ment that money should be used to save Medicare programs and House Representative
Newt Gingrich's argument that saving social security should be a high priority).
15. See generally, Hohler, supra note 14, at A2.
16. See, e.g., Sytek Wants No Strings Attached to Tobacco Settlement Money, Assoc. PRESS, Feb.
10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7384956 (discussing New Hampshire House Speaker Donna
Sytek's plan to fund education); Isabelle de Pommereau, Two States Blow Smoke Over How to
Spend Tobacco Booty New Fire Trucks or Schools? Wrangling Erupts in Florida, Mississippi Over
Spending Huge Windfall, CHRISTIAN SCL MON., Sept. 25, 1997, at 5 (noting that Florida and
Mississippi want to fund the building of new schools and provide a bonus tax refund for
citizens); David Cox, Educators Covet Payoff From Tobacco, TAMPA TviB., August 27, 1997, at 1
(discussing Florida's plan to use its settlement to fund general education and health pro-
grams for children); Mike Glover, Leaders Set Special Tobacco Fund, Assoc. PRESS, April 17,
1997, 1997 WL 2517684 (discussing Iowa legislature's proposal to reimburse medical ex-
penses for treating tobacco-related illnesses and for a campaign to discourage smoking).
Some groups in Mississippi have also requested new fire trucks to put out fires caused by
smoking. See Pommereau, supra, at 5.
17. See S. 1648, 105th Cong. (1998) (SenatorJeffords, for himself and Senators Collins
and Enzi); S. 1638, 105th Cong. (1998) (Senator Conrad, for himself and Senators Das-
chle, Kennedy, Lautenberg, Reed, Leahy, Dodd, Bingaman, Durbin, Baucus, Dorgan,
Rockefeller, Kerry, Wyden, Wellstone, Torricelli, Boxer, Lieberman); S. 1530, 105th Cong.
(1997) (Senator Hatch); S. 1491, 105th Cong. (1997) (Senator Kennedy, for himself and
Senators Lautenberg, Durbin, Reed and Kerry); H.R. 762, 105 Cong. (1997) (Co-spon-
sored by Representatives Hansen, Meehan, Ehlers, McInnis, and Kennedy).
18. See Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, June 18, 1998).
19. See supra note 17.
20. S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 451(a) (May 18,1998).
21. Id. at §451 (b). The Public Health Allocation Account was to receive twenty-two
percent of the net revenues collected from initial payments and all the net revenues col-
lected under the lookback provisions. Id. The funds were to be used for cessation and
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Research Allocation Account, 22 a Medicare Preservation Account,2 3
and the Farmers Assistance Allocation Account. 24  Grants to states
were also contained in the bill, of which 50% of the amount made
available was for the state's discretionary use. 2 5 Rounding out the pro-
grams was more research at the National Science Foundation, 2 6 estab-
lishment of a National Medal of Science, 27 money for smoking
cessation programs at the Indian Health Service, 28 and a Medicare
cancer patient demonstration project.29 Included in the twenty-seven
new spending programs was the elimination of the middle class mar-
riage tax penalty, and the creation of several new trust funds.3 °
Perhaps the most notable new spending program, and the one
that enjoyed potent political support from the President, some mem-
bers in Congress, and many public health organizations, was compen-
sation to tobacco farmers for the anticipated reduction in cigarette
sales that would be occasioned by passage of the McCain Bill."1
Through the Long-Term Economic Assistance for Farmers Act (LEAF
Act) ,32 $28.5 billion was to be channeled into the Tobacco Commu-
nity Revitalization Trust Fund, Community Trust Fund, Tobacco Coin-
treatment programs, the Indian Health Service, education and prevention, counter-adver-
tising activities, surveys and international activities, and FDA enforcement, covering the
FDA's initial outlays and its future operating costs incurred in implementing the bill. Id.
22. Id. at § 451(c) (proposing to fund National Institutes of Health research, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, National Science Foundation research, and can-
cer clinical trials).
23. Id. at § 451(e).
24. Id. at § 451(d).
25. Id. at § 452 (providing that the other 50% go to various programs, including mater-
nal and child health services, funding for child care, child welfare and abuse programs,
programs administered within the State under the authority of the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program, the De-
partment of Education's Dwight D. Eisenhower Professional Development program and
the State Children's Health Insurance Program).
26. Id. at § 454.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§1880-81 (1950).
28. S. 1415, § 453.
29. Id. at § 445 (including an evaluation and report to Congress).
30. See Republican Policy Committee Legislative Notice, S. 1415, (visited June 21, 1998)
<http://www.senate.gov/-rpc/releases/1998/67-tobacco.htm> (identifying six new trust
funds, numerous accounts, twenty-seven new spending programs or "new funding streams
for old ones" and revenues of $755.3 billion to $868.9 billion over 25 years).
31. SeeS. 1415, § 1001; see alsoJames R. Carroll, Tobacco Debate Begins Slowly: Ford-McCon-
nell Duel Over Aid to Farmers Yet to Come, COURIER-J., May 20, 1998, at 12A; Gail Gibson,
Senator Warns Tobacco Farmers, McConnell Sees End to Subsidies, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 26,
1998, at A8.
32. S. 1415, §1001.
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munity Economic Development program, and the Tobacco Worker
Transition program.33
All of the various grants, funds, and programs envisioned under
the McCain Bill were to be paid for out of a set of mandatory and
escalating tobacco industry payments.34 The total payments were esti-
mated to bring in between $500 billion and $860 billion in new
revenue.35
The tobacco industry, however, was not left holding the billion
dollar bag. First, the payments were tax deductible. 36 More impor-
tantly, the McCain Bill immunized and charged the industry to "use its
best efforts" to pass those payments on to smokers in order to drive up
the price of cigarettes and drive down juvenile smoking. 37
33. Id. at § 451. Section 451 (d) states:
Farmers Assistance Allocation Account:
(1) In general. There is established within the trust fund a separate account, to
be known as the Farmers Assistance Account. Of the net revenues credited to the
trust fund under section 401 (b) (1) in each fiscal year -
(A) 16 percent shall be allocated to this account for the first 10 years after the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) 4 percent shall be allocated to this account for each subsequent year until
the account has received a total of $28,500,000,000.
Id. at § 451(d). The LEAF Act would have imposed production and quotas on producers
based on amount of production in the years 1995-1997, and would have compensated to-
bacco producers for lost sales. See id. at § 1021. Title X of the McCain Bill would also have
paid all of the costs incurred by the Department of Agriculture associated with the produc-
tion of tobacco. See id. Perhaps the most stunning provision in the LEAF Act was funding
for the college education of tobacco farmers and their (quite expansively defined) ex-
tended families. See id. at § 1011 (5). Initial funding was $42 billion rising to $72 billion by
the year 2023. See id.
34. Id. at § 402.
35. Senator McCain's latest Commerce Committee bill would raise $500 billion to $700
billion over twenty-years, or as much as $28 billion per year. SeeJeffrey Taylor & Suein L.
Hwang, Tobacco Plan Is Criticized by Industry, WALL ST. J., March 26, 1998, at A1O. A $1.50
pack tax increase, also proposed, would likely cost even more, because Senator McCain's
bill contemplates a price increase of $1.10 per pack. See Bob Hohler, Senators Put a Cap on
Tobacco Liability, BOSTON GLOBE, March 31, 1998, at Al.
36. S. 1415, § 453.
37. Id. at § 404. Section 404 states:
PAYMENTS TO BE PASSED THROUGH TO CONSUMERS.
Each participating tobacco product manufacturer shall use its best efforts to ad-
just the price at which it sells each unit of tobacco products in the domestic mar-
ket or to an importer for resale in the domestic market by an amount sufficient to
pass through to each purchaser on a per-unit basis an equal share of the annual
payments to be made by such tobacco product manufacturer under this Act and
the Master Settlement agreement for the year in which the sale occurs.
Id. at § 404.
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Beyond the price increases, public health was to be served under
the McCain Bill by granting the FDAjurisdiction over tobacco."8 The
Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938"° was amended with Con-
gress finding that:
the use of tobacco products by the Nation's children is a pe-
diatric disease of epic and worsening proportions that results
in new generations of tobacco-dependent children and
adults... [and that] [t]he public interest requires a timely,
fair, equitable, and consistent result that will serve the public
interest by ... providing that a portion of the costs of treat-
ment for diseases and adverse health effects associated with
the use of tobacco products is borne by the manufacturers of
these products .... [i]t is in the public interest for Congress
to adopt legislation to address the public health crisis cre-
ated by actions of the tobacco industry.4"
This sweeping grant of statutory authority to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts4" was based on Congress's declaration that cigarettes were a drug
delivery device.4 2 For good measure, comprehensive new restrictions
on the advertising and marketing of tobacco products were borrowed
from the June 20, 1997 Comprehensive Settlement.4 3
38. See id. at § 3(4), § 3(8). For a discussion regarding the FDA's authority to regulate
tobacco products, see Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 677 passim (1998).
39. See S. 1415 at § 101 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq).
40. Id. at §§ 2(1), 2(16), and 2(31). Interestingly, no statement about the costs being
borne by smokers is mentioned in the bill.
41. See id. at § 101 (proposing redesignation of chapter IX of the Food, Drug & Cos-
metic Act as Chapter X and adding several new sections under a new Title IX of that Act
variously governing adulterated tobacco products (§ 902); misbranded tobacco products
(§903); the disclosure of health information and research results by the tobacco industry to
the FDA (§ 904); requiring the annual registration of manufacturers and processors
(§ 905); authorizing the FDA to ban any product appropriate for the protection of public
health, or to "restrict the sale, distribution, promotion of, or access to tobacco products
(§ 906); specifying the "methods, facilities and controls to be used in the manufacture,
reproduction design validation, packing, and storage of tobacco products" (§ 906(e)); and
various other provisions ranging from performance standards, recall authority and judicial
review to postmarket surveillance of a product (§§ 907-916)). The McCain Bill would have
also extended the authority of the FDA to regulate the export of tobacco products. Id at
§ 102.
42. See id. at § 103; 21 C.F.R. pt. 897.3 (1997). However, the Fourth Circuit recently
held the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Food &DrugAdmin., Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614, 97-1605, 1998
WL 473320, at *1 (41h Cir.1998).
43. See S. 1414 §§ 121-22 (setting forth requirements relating to the retailers and sales
to minors as well as to the manufacture and distribution of cigarettes). See generally, Gar-
ner, supra note 4.
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Perhaps the most innovative idea in the McCain Bill was its "look-
back penalties,"4 4 and it too was borrowed from the June settlement
agreement between the Attorneys General and the tobacco industry.
The idea was elegantly simple: teenage usage falls or taxes go up.4 5
The McCain Bill, like the June settlement agreement, set optimistic
goals for the reduction of teen smoking that were to be met within ten
years of its passage." In the third and fourth years after passage of
the bill, teen smoking was to be reduced by 15%. 4 7 The targets for the
fifth and sixth years were set at 30%, and for the seventh, eighth, and
ninth years, at 50%, while from the tenth year and beyond the re-
quired reduction was set at 60%.48 These reduction goals were not
just noble legislative pronouncements. They were backed up by $4 bil-
lion in monetary lookback penalties to be imposed on the industry for
failure to meet them.49
In contrast to the payments, regulations, and penalties imposed
on the industry by the McCain Bill, the industry got very little of what
it wanted: immunity from private suits such as limits on class actions
and punitive damages.5 ' The one bone thrown to the industry was a
cap of $6.5 billion in liability damages that it would have to pay in any
44. See S. 1415 at § 204.
45. See The Tobacco Resolution, supra note 6.
46. See id. at § 203 (b).
47. Id. Comparable levels were established for reductions in smokeless tobacco use,
12.5%, 25%, 35% and 45% respectively. Id. at § 203 (c).
48. Id. at § 203 (b).
49. See id. at § 204. If the percentage targets for underage smoking reduction were not
met, the industry would face stiff penalties in the name of "Industry-wide Non-attainment
Surcharges." Id. at § 204(e). The Secretary of the Treasury was tasked by the bill to annu-
ally determine an "industry-wide non-attainment percentage." Id. at § 204(e) (1). On the
basis of this percentage, payments (i.e., fines) were to be made annually by the tobacco
industry to the National Tobacco Trust Fund (NTTF). Id. at § 401(b)(3). These progres-
sive penalties for cigarette sales would be imposed as follows:
If the non-attainment percentage (NA%) is: The surcharge is:
Not more than 5 percent $80,000,000 multiplied by the non-
attainment percentage
More than 5% but not more than 10% $400,000,000 plus $160,000,000
multiplied by the non-attainment
percentage in excess of 5% but
not in excess of 10%
More than 10% $1,200,000,000 plus $240,000,000
multiplied by the non-attainment
percentage in excess of 10%
More than 21.6% $4,000,000,000
Id. at § 204 (e)(2).
50. See S. 1414, 105th Cong. § 702 (1998).
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one year.5 But amid the growing demonization of Big Tobacco and
the fervid professions by Senators of their desire to protect "the kids"
from this evil industry even that bone was snatched back.52 First the
cap was raised to $8 billion and then eliminated altogether.53
Big Tobacco bolted, led by RJR Nabisco Chairman Steven Gold-
stone.54 But the industry did not just walk out. On April 25, 1998, it
launched a massive effort to mobilize opposition to the bill.55 The
print and TV campaign labeled the McCain Bill as nothing more than
"half a trillion in new taxes" to run "17 new government panels,
boards and task forces. '56 The grassroots effort generated up to
10,000 calls per day to Senators. 57 But the tobacco industry did not
just pull this campaign out of thin air. Before the industry launched its
drive, the Wall Street Journal reported on April 23, 1998, that 70 per-
cent of the electorate already believed the real motive behind the to-
bacco legislation was to raise more taxes.58
On the night of June 17, 1998, Congress got the message and
threw in the towel on tobacco legislation. Forty-three Senate Republi-
cans joined by three Democrats killed the McCain Bill on a proce-
dural vote. 9 Conservative Senators like Larry Craig, who had first
thought that McCain would easily pass, said that, "[T] eenage smoking
became a secondary issue in a feeding feast to raise tax dollars."60 Lib-
eral Senators like Edward Kennedy called the vote "craven," and all
around the tobacco industry was blamed for its large contributions
mainly to the opponents of the bill and, its massive and effective pub-
lic relations effort to let Congress know that in the words of an indus-
try spokesman: "[T]here is no national consensus to pass an $800
51. See Congress Opposes Industry Liability Protection, 2 INVESTOR'S TOBACCO REP., No.2,
1997 at 1.
52. See The Senate's Tobacco Wad, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at A12.
53. See id.; Congress Opposes Industry Liability Protection, supra note 51.
54. See Congress Opposes Industry Liability Protection, supra note 51.
55. See Suein Hwang et al., GOP Mulls Narrower Tobacco Measure That May Withhold Liabil-
ity Protection, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at A3.
56. See The Senate's Tobacco Wad, supra note 52, at A14; Major Garrett & Kenneth T.
Walsh, Congress Snuffs Out the Tobacco Bill Ad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 29, 1998, at
30.
57. See Garrett & Walsh, supra note 56, at 33.
58. See Paul A. Gigot, Why McCain's Tobacco Bill Turned to Ashes, WALL ST. J., June 19,
1998, at A14.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 30.
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billion tax increase this year."6 1 Even an anti-tobacco senator con-
ceded that McCain "got a little too big and too convoluted. 62
II. SMOKERS
A. Demographics
If smokers were as rich and smoking as glamorous as portrayed in
our popular culture, the question of whether the bill was a justified
imposition on tobacco users would be much easier to answer. How-
ever, the reality is that smoking is a habit of the economic and social
underclass.6 3 Robert Samuelson, in a commentary recently appearing
in The Washington Post, noted that "the Congressional joint committee
on taxation estimates that 53 percent of the present cigarette tax (240
a pack) is paid by taxpayers with incomes under $30,000. "164 Only
seven percent of the tax comes from those with incomes over
$75,000.65 According to the 1994 National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS), only 13.8 percent of highly educated males and 10.4 percent
of highly educated females (16 years or more of education) smoke,
while 38.2 percent of high school dropouts smoke and 42.2 percent of
Native Americans smoke.
6 6
Smokers are not just economically poor; they are also the poor
victims of the tobacco industry's 40-year-long campaign of public de-
ception. 6 7 The tobacco companies knew long ago that smoking was
addictive and understood that it could alter the degree of addiction by
varying the levels of nicotine." Yet the tobacco industry continued to
deny the adverse health effects of smoking.69 In fact, as early as the
1950s, the tobacco companies made claims that their products were
61. See Jeffrey Taylor, Senate GOP Kills Anti-tobacco Measure: Move is Seen Setting Stage for
Legislative Warfare, Framing Election Issue, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1998, at A3.
62. See Major Garrett & Kenneth T. Walsh, Congress Snuffs Out the Tobacco Bill, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 29, 1998, at 32 (quoting Democratic Sen. John Kerry).
63. See Kenneth E. Warner et al., Criteria for Determining an Optimal Cigarette Tax: The
Economist's Perspective, 4 TOBACCO CONTROL 380, 384 (1995).
64. See RobertJ. Samuelson, Smoking Fictions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1998, at A17.
65. Id.
66. See AM. CANCER SOC'Y, 1996 CANCER RISK REPORT-1997:TOBACCO USE. Tbl.1-A
(1997).
67. See Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Industry Was Silent on Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at
Al.
68. See id. After reviewing evidence that the tobacco industry had genetically altered
tobacco by making more addictive strains, David Kessler reported to Congress that there
could be no doubt that tobacco companies manipulated nicotine content to cause stronger
addiction. See Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Chief Denies Nicotine Scheme in Testimony, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1994, at Al.
69. See Sheryl Stolberg, Defectors Helping To Crack Wall Around Tobacco Firms, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1996, at Al.
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harmless and even beneficial, although studies in the 1930s had al-
ready indicated the contrary.7 °
But it is not just the deception that makes addicted smokers ob-
jects of pity. These adults became addicted as teenagers with the con-
stant encouragement of slick tobacco advertising aimed directly at
them.7 ' And tobacco advertising seems to work especially well on
young troubled teenagers72 with the average age of smoking initiation
at 14 years.73 The teenagers who are most susceptible to the allure of
smoking are those from low income families, disrupted families, those
struggling with school, and those most alienated from family and soci-
ety at large.74 Young smokers are 18 times more likely to attempt sui-
cide than non-smokers.75
B. Fairness
The regressivity of the proposed tobacco taxes in the recent to-
bacco legislation was so extraordinary that it promised to broaden the
already wide gulf between rich and poor in the United States. In order
to justify this infliction of pain, on adult citizens who are breaking no
law in order to deter minors from breaking the law, at least two funda-
mental conditions must be met. First, there should be a fair degree of
certainty that doubling the price of cigarettes will deter teenage smok-
70. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY. LAW, PoLI-
TICS, AND CULTURE 137 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
71. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 66 (1997) (explaining that
despite industry denials of targeting youths, evidence clearly indicates the contrary).
72. See Richard W. Pollay et al., The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market
Shares Among Youths and Adults, 1979-1993, J. MARKETING, Spring 1996, at 1 (finding that
teenagers are three times more receptive to cigarette ads than adults and that they tend to
smoke the most heavily advertised brands); Nicola Evans et al., Influence of Tobacco Market-
ing and Exposure to Smokers on Adolescent Susceptibility to Smoking, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
1538, passim (1995) (showing correlation between adolescent receptivity to tobacco adver-
tising and susceptibility to smoking); John P. Pierce et al., Smoking Initiation by Adolescent
Girls, 1944 through 1988: an Association With Targeted Advertising, 271 JAMA 608, passim
(1994) (showing correlation between introduction of "women's brands" of cigarettes in
1967 and rise in smoking rates among adolescent girls); Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR
Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to Children, 266 JAMA 3149 passim (1991)
(showing huge increase in adolescent preference for Camel cigarettes after introduction of
"Joe Camel" cartoon character); Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children
Aged 3 to 6 Years. Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991) (showing
that 91.3% of six-year-olds recognized Joe Camel and associated it with cigarettes).
73. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 41 (1994).
74. See id.
75. See Smoking in High School Seen as Possible Predictor of Suicide, S. ILLINOISAN (Carbon-
dale, IL), Aug. 16, 1994, at A6.
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ing. Second, the tax money must not be spent to enrich the more
prosperous constituencies served by Washington politicians.
With regard to the first condition, there is good evidence that
dramatically raising the price of tobacco would have led to a signifi-
cant reduction in juvenile consumption.76 In view of the stunning
jump in juvenile tobacco use over the last six years (32 percent overall
increase with an 80 percent jump among black students),77 every
weapon in the public's arsenal can legitimately be employed.
The principal problem with the McCain Bill, however, was not
the raising but the spending of taxes. Some programs were eminently
justified, such as the funding of various public health measures from
counter-advertising to cancer research.7" But some big ticket items
were more than a little suspect. One of the biggest expenditures
under the bill was paying off the states for their losses incurred in
payment of smoking-induced medical and social costs.7" The McCain
Bill and all its alternatives shared a similar vision of the economic
losses that smoking imposes on society." In Senator McCain's words:
An objective review of my legislative career would reveal a
solid record of support for lowering taxes and opposing
wasteful government spending. But smokers impose a $50
billion per year "vice tax" on the U.S., much of it in Medicaid
and Medicare costs required to treat diseases caused by
smoking. Of course the advertisements that tobacco compa-
nies ran against the bill failed to mention that tax. It seems
fair to make smokers assume a larger share of those costs. If
people choose to smoke, they shouldn't expect the rest of us
to pick up the tab for their bad habit.8 '
76. See e.g., Testimony of Martin Feldman, supra note 1; Big Price Boost Would Deter
Youths'Smoking, supra note 1, at 6B. For adults, however, the price of cigarettes has a much
smaller effect on their decision to buy, likely because of nicotine's addictive qualities. See,
e.g., WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS 171 (1991); see also
Warner, supra note 63, at 385 ("Taxation has been shown to be an effective deterrent to
smoking, however, with the preponderance of evidence suggesting that this is especially
true among children, and even many smoking adults support tax increases with the expec-
tation that they will discourage children from initiating nicotine addictions." (citation
omitted)).
77. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Tobacco Use Among High School Students-
United States, 1997, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLv. REP., April 3, 1998, at 229.
78. S. 1415, 105th Cong. (May 18, 1998).
79. Id.
80. See Donald Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 286-290 (1977)
(discussing economic losses that smoking imposes on society).
81. John McCain, Conservative Agenda Lies in Ashes, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1998, at A18.
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While Senator McCain may be sure that smoking generates large
social costs, many experts are not.8 2 Various studies have considered
the costs of cigarettes on society and concluded that as a result of
pension, Social Security, and nursing home savings, smokers put less
of a financial strain on society, and that the resources they do con-
sume are covered by the taxes paid on cigarettes.8 "
For instance, in the comprehensive study of the external costs of
smoking conducted in 1989 by the Rand corporation, no external
costs were found. 4 The RAND study was based on the seemingly inal-
terable reality that if a smoker does not die from a smoking-related
illness, he will die from something else.8 5 The study, therefore, did
not just add up how much was spent on treating smoking-related ill-
nesses. Instead, the study measured the social cost of smoking, calcu-
lated as the difference between the amount that was spent on treating a
smoker's illness and what the smoker would have cost society if he had
not smoked.86 The study concluded that premature death attributed
to smoking resulted in a net savings in retirement costs, including
costs associated with nursing home care on the average of $500 per
person. 7
A similar study conducted by the Congressional Research Service
concluded that the external costs of a pack of cigarettes amounted to
82. See generally, True Price of Smoking, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 17, 1997, at A22.
83. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 76, at 171; Warner, supra note 63, at 382; W. Kip
Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 53, 75 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). See
also Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 1163, 1232, 1249 (1998). Hanson and Logue pres-
ent a detailed comparison of the costs attributed by Manning, Viscusi, and Warner to
smoking as compared to the greater costs as seen by Hanson and Logue. Id. at 1242, tbl. 1.
The theory touted by Manning, Viscusi, and Warner has also been severely criticized for its
unprincipled approach. Id. at 1256. Hanson and Logue noted in contrast that "in debates
of the appropriate response to environmental hazards, we do not hear polluters urging
policymakers to take into account the many pension-saving deaths that would result if Con-
gress would only leave polluters unregulated... [L]ikewise, opponents of gun control are
not heard to tout the enormous financial windfall to society from all the premature deaths
caused by handguns." Id. This cost analysis has been criticized as excluding some impor-
tant costs to society, such as the pain caused to family members and the unpaid liabilities
left after a smoker's death. Id.
84. See Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their
Way?, 261 JAMA 1604, 1606 (1989). See alSoJANE G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGA-
RErrE TAXES TO FUND HEALTH CARE REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CONG. RES. SERV.
REP. No. 94-214E at 4 n.3 (Mar. 8, 1994).
85. See Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22
S.ILL.U. L.J. 601, 635 (1998).
86. See Manning et al., supra note 84, at 1605-1606.
87. For a more thorough discussion of the RAND study and its application, see generally
Levy, supra note 85.
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33 cents, while the excise taxes levied on a pack was 53 cents.88 In
effect, smokers not only cause a net "savings" based on the total out-
lays associated with retirement due to their premature deaths, they
also pay a much higher amount in taxes than the costs their smoking
caused.89
When looked at from the viewpoint of what this bloody business
deserves, it is grotesque to credit the industry with the Social Security
costs that are saved as a result of its killing off 420,000 of its loyal
customers each year, often before they retire. ° But this "death
credit" takes on an entirely different light when the question be-
comes, "How much do smokers owe the rest of us for the medical costs
associated with treating smoking-related diseases when, as a conse-
quence of those smoking-related diseases, they fail to collect their So-
cial Security?" If smokers in effect reimburse society by not lingering
in nursing homes or by conveniently dying early, why should they be
forced to now pay more?
Even if one were to concede that smoking imposes large external
costs on society that should be paid back through higher taxes on
tobacco there still remains one very large problem with the McCain
Bill and all of the alternatives. Poor smokers were drafted to pay for
middle class programs that had nothing to do with health care costs,
much less public health.
To take out just one small example, by what right do tobacco
growers, who first profit from the sale of an addictive drug to chil-
dren, deserve to profit again from the taxes imposed on those who
have become addicted to the drug? Was there not something a little
unseemly about McCain's "Farm Opportunity Grants" that would have
harvested millions of dollars from smokers, who are often too impov-
erished or ill-educated to go to college themselves, so that tobacco
farmers and their fine sons and daughters (and stepchildren and
daughters-in-law, and sons-in-law, etc.) can all go to college for free?9 '
Perhaps the idea was to make tobacco lawyers out of tobacco farmers
so that smokers will be more adequately represented in their civil suits
against themselves. Perhaps funeral directors and their children
should have gotten tobacco scholarships because fewer smokers would
88. See GRAVELLE & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 84, at 7-8, 15-17, 54.
89. See id. See also Levy, supra note 85.
90. See Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-United States,
1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 645, 645-49 (1993); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS 106 (1992).
91. See Tobacco Products Control Act of 1998, §1032 <http:www.senate.gov/commerce/
legis/legis.htm>.
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be dying on time. At least the funeral directors, unlike tobacco farm-
ers, did not deal in a drug that kills more Americans every year than
died in battle in all of World War II.
When no one in Washington ever concerned themselves with
whether it was right to treat the 45 million citizens who smoke as cash
cows for pet programs, the results were not hard to predict: a grab bag
of special interest favors that would be rejected by the American peo-
ple. If the plundering of the poor had been a source of embarrass-
ment instead of delight, then a barrier to keep out the more rapacious
special interests could have been erected. If the debate had not been
so one-sided, the McCain Bill would have been shaped more like a
public health measure and less like a big government boondoggle.
But smokers are so thoroughly disenfranchised and generally de-
spised that they were not invited to the negotiating table. They were
not complaining, and they would have meekly paid all the taxes laid
upon them because they do not have the morale to resist.92 It was only
out of the good will of the people and the bad faith of the cigarette
cartel that America's underclass was saved from Washington.
The shabby treatment regularly accorded smokers is beginning to
make them look more and more like a new minority upon whom the
self-righteous majority can freely visit any insult, tax or segregation.
Where is the justice in refusing to employ smokers who are willing to
smoke only at home? 3 Perhaps it is just as well that they get used to
being confined to their homes. California, on the theory that it is
unhealthy to work and relax in smoky bars, expelled all smokers from
all bars in the state.94 On such a theory, all drinking should be elimi-
nated from bars.
While smokers do not suffer, as other racial minorities have, from
an immutable condition of birth that marks them for discrimination,
they are nevertheless bound to their wretched status by a garotte of
addiction.95 Thus when smokers are the subjects of lawsuits and pub-
92. See Survey, Selected Cigarette Smoking Initiation and Quitting Behaviors Among High School
Students - United States, 1997, MORBIDITY MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, May 22, 1998, at 386-89
(suggesting that smoking tobacco is addictive).
93. See generally, Donald Garner, Protecting Job Opportunities of Smokers: Fair Treatment for
the New Minority, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 417 passim (1993). "[A] significant number of
employers (about six percent) now refuse to hire smokers even though the smoking is
done at home." Milo Gevelin, The Job is Yours - Unless You Smoke, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
1989, at B1.
94. CAL. LABOR CODE § 6404.5(8) (West Ann. 1997).
95. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:
NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 9 (1988). A study by the Office
on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that of
the 70% of adults who would like to quit smoking, 34% try to quit each year and only 8%
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lic health pronouncements, they are fairly portrayed as crippled vic-
tims of an industry that lies and manipulates. In tobacco Medicaid
suits, smokers are accurately characterized as being "addicted" and
"deceived."96 Yet when smokers are the subject of a half trillion dollar
tax hit, their plight is ignored. The Tobacco Institute could not have
said it better or been more hypocritical than Senator Kerry from Mas-
sachusetts, who declared that the proposed McCain taxes were not
really so bad because smokers were free to pay or not pay them. The
taxes were actually "voluntary" in nature.97 Did Primo Levi think that
smoking was voluntary after seeing starving inmates in Birkenau sell
their gold teeth for tobacco?98
The public policy that was practiced in Washington during the
tobacco deliberations had a familiar ring: take the money, spread it
around, and proclaim a great victory. Congress and the Presidency
did virtually nothing for 30 years except to take large tobacco industry
contributions 99 and would have been perfectly content to take enor-
mous tobacco taxes from poor smokers but for the troubling pile of
10,000 letters a day from angry voters.' 0 It seems as if the prospect of
getting their hands on $800 billion in new tax money, with no political
liability, blinded our protectors of the commonweal to the reality of
just who was going to pick up the tab for the fine party that was being
planned by the plaintiffs' lawyers and Washington special interests. It
was not the tobacco industry that was going to pay. It was their ad-
dicted customers who engaged in no wrongdoing, and who have no
control over how tobacco is advertised or how nicotine is
manipulated.
III. IDEAS FOR A FAIR MINDED TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
Big Tobacco and poor smokers are like strange Siamese twins
joined at the spine. A slap to the evil twin stings also the one who had
are successful. See 8% of Smokers Who Try To Quit Succeed, Survey Says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1994, at A4. This result is not surprising considering that nicotine's addictive characteris-
tics have been found to be "in the top tier with cocaine, heroin and alcohol." SeeJon D.
Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1194 (1998) (quoting Frontline: The Nicotine War (WGBH
radio broadcast, Jan. 3, 1995)).
96. See Robert J. Samuelson, Smoking Lesson, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 1998, at
A23.
97. See Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, June 18, 1998).
98. See PRIMO LEVI, IF THIS IS A MAN 93 (Stuart Woolf trans., The Orion Press) (1950).
99. See e.g., Jeffery Taylor & Phil Kuntz, Despite Polls, God Doesn't Fear Voter Heat on To-
bacco, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1998, at A24 (noting $5.3 million was donated by tobacco inter-
ests by March 31, for the 1998 election cycle).
100. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the small misfortune to become addicted in the seventh grade. Given
the unique bonds of dependancy between cigarette makers and ciga-
rette users, great care should be used in designing any new tobacco
taxation scheme. The motivating principle should be to maximize
public health while minimizing pain to the addicted poor.
These goals might best be accomplished by utilizing the innova-
tive concept of lookback penalties that tax the tobacco companies in
relation to the amount their products are illegally used by children. A
good starting point might be to set the penalties at $24 billion a year,
which roughly approximates the operating income reported by all of
the tobacco companies for 1997."°' This amount would probably get
the sincere attention of Big Tobacco. The fines would be levied not
on the industry as a whole, but would be settled on the brands that are
popular with teenagers. Thus, Marlboro and Camel would skyrocket
in price while leaving dull generic brands unscathed. Adult smokers
could flee to the cheap brands while those with cachet among the
prepubescent would become quite pricy.
An immediate and dramatic incentive would thus be created for
the industry to get out of the business of marketing to kids. To avoid
financial peril the cigarette makers would be caused to use all of their
skill and cunning to stop sales to children and, more generally, to
render smoking uncool. Were these penalties not allowed to be tax
deductible, a double incentive would be created. Were all tobacco ad-
vertising costs to be denied corporate tax deductibility, a triple incen-
tive to make smoking truly an adult diversion would be guaranteed.
Harnessing the energy and duplicity of the tobacco industry in
the service of public health may well work wonders. Increases of 30%
in teenager rates of smoking° 2-when they have been warned and
preached to for 30 years'1 3-may indicate that something very new
should be tried. For all of the good that has in the past been accom-
plished by the Surgeon General, volunteer and medical groups, anti-
smoking organizations, counter-advertising and school programs, re-
strictions on cigarette advertising, price increases, legal controls on
101. See How Real is the Bankruptcy Threat?, 2 INVESTOR'S TOBACCO REPORTER no. 2, 1998,
at 2.
102. See Alan L. Calnan, Tobacco Litigation and Regulation: The Settlement and Beyond Litiga-
tion and Compensation, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 577, 646 (1998) (indicating that smoking increased
by 30% among eighth graders between 1991 - 1994); Kelder & Daynard, supra note 71, at
65 (finding a 30% smoking increase among eighth graders, a 20% increase among tenth
graders, and a 12.5% increase among twelfth graders) (citing A Surge in Teenage Smoking,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 31, 1995, at 8.).
103. See Calnan, supra note 102 (stating that teenagers are not scared of risk, but "in-
stead, they are fascinated and allured by it").
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access to tobacco products, and the countless entreaties of family,
priest, and friend, the relentless march towards addiction and prema-
ture death by our young people still passes in front of our incredulous
eyes.
Indeed, smoking is beginning to take on all the allure of the for-
bidden, with virtually every movie using smoking as a way of demon-
strating independency from convention.1"4 Perhaps the tobacco
industry can, through employment of all of its capacity for deceit and
market manipulation, begin to turn back an approaching public
health disaster.
By exposing the tobacco industry to a bruising new market that
rewards efficiency in reducing youth consumption, cigarette makers
will be given a powerful and self-serving reason to enter the tobacco
wars on the side of public health. In all events, the proposed lookback
system would eliminate the desire of the tobacco companies to spend
$6 billion a year in advertising °5 devoted to recruiting (in the words
of an RJR executive) the "14-24 age group. 1 0 6
Fearsome lookback penalties would even justify industry immu-
nity from class actions, punitive damages and all other types of civil
liability that are not based on new wrongdoing by the cigarette makers
or on injuries to non-smokers. The point is not to be nice to Big To-
bacco; the point of eliminating billion dollar verdicts in smoker class
action suits is to prevent further price increases from being imposed
on smokers for the primary benefit of lawyers.
The Engle case, 0 7 now being tried in Florida, is a perfect example
of the kind of litigation that could be eliminated under a lookback
penalty regime with very little loss to public health. In Engle, a class of
addicted, deceived and diseased smokers is suing the tobacco industry
claiming various civil wrongs. The problem is, of course, that the bill
for these civil wrongs will be instantly sent for payment to the class of
addicted, deceived smokers who are not yet diseased.
The Florida class action flight attendant case, Broin v. Phillip Mor-
ris Co., tells us how Engle might turn out given that the same lawyers
104. See, e.g., THE GAME (Paramount Productions, 1997) (rebellious but knowing Sean
Penn, when told by his responsible but emotionally blocked brother, to stop smoking in a
San Francisco restaurant, coolly responds, "Fuck California").
105. See Minnesota v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WIAL 36940, at *31 (Dist.
Ct. Minn., Jan. 26, 1998) (Trial Tr.) (regarding billion-dollar marketing campaigns aimed
at enticing youth to start smoking).
106. See Minnesota Takes Tobacco Companies to Court, TOBACco NEWS, Sp. 1998 at 4.
107. See Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., [12 No. 11] Mealey's Litig. Rep. Tobacco
(Mealey Publications, Inc.) 14 (FI.Cir.Ct. Ill'Jud. Cir. Dade County 1998).
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brought both cases.' ° 8 The Broin case settled with the stewardess get-
ting no money, the industry promising to fund a fancy environmental
tobacco smoke research center, and the lawyers for the injured flight
attendants walking out with a $50 million fee.' 9 At least Broin was
brought for the benefit of non-smokers whereas smoker class actions
involve nothing more than one group of smokers suing fellow smok-
ers with the lawyers in the middle angling for a house cut that would
embarrass a Las Vegas pit boss.110
But whatever criticism can be made of the Broin case and settle-
ment, it is the kind of litigation that should be allowed to continue
even under a lookback penalty regime. If smoking is proven in court
to cause non-smokers or the public harm, then tobacco, and its users,
should pay. Medicaid suits, tested by judicial proceeding, not specula-
tion by politicians, would not be affected. Like second-hand smoking
injury cases, claims seeking compensation for fire deaths suffered by
non-smokers due to the industry's manufacture of cigarettes designed
never to go out would also be allowed."1 1 The only cases that should
be swept away are those that are brought by smokers with lawyers
against smokers without lawyers.
But whatever one might think about civil liability immunities, law-
suits will never be an effective means to deal with the death, disability,
and disease suffered by 45 million Americans."1 2 America's public
health is in sad shape if the only deterrent to teenage smoking is more
litigation. What is needed is a tectonic shift in tobacco policy. While
important health victories have been won through lawsuits," 3 the war
will not be won until the enemy is rendered an ally.
Massive lookback penalties would make teenage smoking a curse,
instead of a blessing, for an industry that lives by recruiting fresh
young smokers to replace diseased old smokers. Not only would a
lookback penalty regime fundamentally change the industry's way of
doing business, the administration of the regime would be an adminis-
108. See Broin v. Phillip Morris Companies, 641 So.2d. 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
109. SeeJohn Pacenti, Flight Attendants Seek Approval of $349 Million, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 26,
1998, at 1-2, available in 1998 WL 7379727.
110. See id.
111. See Donald Garner, Cigarette Fires and Civil Liability: An Open and Obvious Solution,
PUBLIC ISSUES AND THE LAW, Fall 1986.
112. See AM. CANCER SOc'Y, 1996 CANCER RISK REPORT, supra note 66.
113. See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 36940, at *3
(Dist.Ct.Minn., Jan. 26, 1998) (Trial Tr.) (disclosing billion-dollar marketing campaigns
aimed at enticing youth to start smoking); Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d
73 (Cal. 1994). For an interesting description of Mangini and how the Joe Camel cam-
paign was proven to be aimed at children, see Nina Siegal, The Last Days ofJoe Camel, CAL.
LAWYER, Nov. 1998, at 38-44.
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trative snap. No new agencies would need to be created and no new
programs would need to be funded. Calculating teenage brand pref-
erences and sending out the dreaded penalty notices could be han-
dled by the Treasury Department without too much trouble.
So what to do with tens of billions in new revenues that would be
generated by the lookback penalties? Give it back to smokers by way of
reduction in taxes paid by working class Americans. Closing off the
revenue circle and rebating the money back to the innocent citizens
who paid it would serve both justice and politics. Given that smokers
often are not around to collect their Social Security, an obvious way to
return the lookback penalties revenues would be a reduction in Social
Security taxes for the poorest workers. By indirectly funneling the tax
back to smokers, no incentive to continue to smoke would be created,
yet a powerful incentive to reduce teenage smoking would be placed
on the industry that helped lure children to smoke in the first place.
Equally important, by treating smokers fairly, the political prospects
for enacting a lookback system would be enhanced. By giving the
penalty money back after it has done its work on juvenile demand, a
clear and unequivocal message would be sent by Washington to the
public: "This time folks, it is really about kids."
The ideas advanced here may or may not be so beguiling or effi-
cient or fair as this article supposes that they are. But whatever their
virtue it seems more and more likely that no idea, no initiative, no
legislation designed to hold the tobacco giants accountable will be en-
acted at the federal level. After the collapse of the McCain Bill, the
American people seem tired of watching Washington's phony war
against tobacco. In July1998, only 6% of the electorate thought that
tobacco legislation was an issue important enough to be considered in
their choices for House and Senate seats.114 By November 1998, to-
bacco regulation played no role at all in the congressional races.' 15
An historic chance to do the right thing seems to have been irre-
trievably squandered. By arrogantly seeking to press their advantage
over cigarette makers, President Clinton, Congress, tobacco lawyers,
Attorneys General, and all the special interest groups have lent credi-
bility to the industry charge that tobacco legislation is really about
more taxes, not more public health. Something is very wrong in
Washington when Big Tobacco can assume the mantle of tribune to
the poor and not be laughed out of town. That something is a fair
regard for the interest of smokers.
114. See John Harwood & Michael Frisby, Democrats, Searching for Election Theme, Weigh
Campaign Over Who Should Fix Social Security, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1998, at A16.
115. SeeJoe Dew, Voters' Reasons Don't Include Clinton, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Nov. 4, 1998, at All (stating voters set aside Clinton's stand against the proposed
tobacco policy in voting).
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